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Abstract
Absent much theory, empirical works often rely on the following informal reasoning when
looking for evidence of a mutual fund tournament: If there is a tournament, interim winners
have incentives to decrease their portfolio volatility as they attempt to protect their lead,
while interim losers are expected to increase their volatility so as to catch up with winners.
We consider a rational model of a mutual fund tournament in the presence of short-sale
constraints and ﬁnd the opposite – interim winners choose more volatile portfolios in equi-
librium than interim losers. Several empirical works present evidence consistent with our
model, however based on the above informal argument they appear to conclude against the
tournament behavior. We argue that this conclusion is unwarranted. We also demonstrate
that tournament incentives lead to diﬀerences in interim performance for otherwise identical
managers, and that mid-year trading volume is inversely related to mid-year stock return.
JEL Classiﬁcations: G11, D81.
Keywords: mutual fund tournament, risk-taking incentives, relative performance, portfolio
choice, short-sale constraints.1. Introduction
In an inﬂuential paper, Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) (BHS, hereafter) used the term
“tournament” to describe the mutual fund market, meaning that fund managers attempt
to outperform each other. A common justiﬁcation for why managers care about relative
performance is that they seek to attract higher money inﬂows by exploiting the positive
relation between relative performance and money ﬂows (Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Sirri
and Tuﬀano (1998)). Given that managers are typically paid a ﬁxed percentage of assets
under management, a manager’s compensation increases with the amount of inﬂows, and so
caring about relative returns is consistent with rational self-interest.
To test for tournament behavior, BHS suggest looking at how managers change the risk-
iness of their portfolios over the second half of a year depending on their interim mid-year
performance. According to BHS, mid-year losers are expected to increase the volatility of
their portfolios to a greater extent than mid-year winners. The justiﬁcation seems quite
convincing: interim losers gamble in an attempt to catch up with interim winners, while
interim winners play it safe in order to protect their lead. Apart from having an intuitive
appeal, the idea that losers adopt riskier strategies than winners is consistent with the predic-
tions of tournament models in other settings (Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990), McLaughlin
(1988)) and also with “gambling on resurrection” by troubled banks (Dewatripont and Tirole
(1995)).
Is it indeed the case that the risk-taking incentives faced by fund managers are similar
to those observed in other tournament settings? To address this question, we postulate (for
the bulk of the paper) that managers have diﬀerent interim performance, and investigate
how the equilibrium level of risk taken by a manager depends on her interim performance.
While we analyze a series of settings with diﬀerent degrees of generality (discussed later),
we demonstrate our key result in the context of an intentionally stylized baseline model so
as to convey the main intuition as clearly as possible. The baseline model is as follows. The
economy is populated by a continuum of risk-neutral fund managers with diﬀerent interim
performance. The investment opportunities are given by two assets, a risky stock and a
riskless bond, and the managers face portfolio constraints in that they can only take long
positions in the assets. What makes this a tournament setting is the assumption that at
1the terminal date each manager receives money inﬂows which depend on her performance
relative to the industry-average performance via an increasing and convex ﬂow-performance
relationship, as widely documented in the empirical literature.1
Solving for equilibrium in the baseline model, we obtain the main result of our paper that
interim winners choose more volatile portfolios than interim losers. This is the opposite of
the tournament hypothesis proposed by BHS and widely used in subsequent works (Busse
(2001), Qiu (2003), Goriaev, Nijman, Werker (2005), Reed and Wu (2005)). The intuition
is as follows. The convexity of the ﬂow-performance relationship leads to the convexity of
a manager’s objective function, implying that a manager seeks to maximize the volatility
of her tracking error (diﬀerence between own and industry-average returns). Hence, each
manager holds only one asset in her portfolio, either stock or bond, whichever diﬀerentiates
her portfolio more from the industry portfolio. This implies that in equilibrium it has to be
the case that some managers invest in the stock while the remainder invest in the bond.
Why is it the interim winners who invest in the stock in equilibrium? If an interim
winner invests in the risky stock, she is able to convert her high interim performance into
a high volatility of the year-end return, which is due to the basic fact that the year-end
return volatility is proportional to the interim performance. If on the other hand an interim
winner invests in the riskless bond, then her year-end return is constant, meaning that the
mechanism which converts interim performance into return volatility is eﬀectively switched
oﬀ. Hence, in equilibrium interim winners invest in the stock so as to “leverage” their high
interim performance, thus driving interim losers into the bond.
To demonstrate the robustness of our results, we consider several generalizations of our
baseline model. First, to account for risk aversion and also for heterogeneity in risk aversion
(Koijen (2008)), we consider a setting with two types of managers, relatively risk tolerant
and relatively risk averse. The analysis of this model reveals that it is the interplay between
the convexity of ﬂow-performance relation and the concavity of managers’ objective function
that determines how risk taking depends on interim performance. For relatively risk tolerant
managers for whom the ﬂows convexity is dominant, we ﬁnd that the relation between
1We take the ﬂow-performance relation as given, and so do not address the issue of why retail investors
reward past performers despite the lack of conclusive evidence on performance persistence (see Carhart
(1997), Bollen and Busse (2005), and references therein) or relatedly, on the link between past performance
and stock-picking skills (Berk and Green (2004), Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers (2000)).
2interim performance and the choice of portfolio volatility is as in the baseline model. As for
relatively risk averse managers for whom the objective function concavity is dominant, their
equilibrium portfolios are virtually insensitive to interim performance as these managers do
not care much about winning the tournament, and hence about their interim standings.
Second, we generalize our baseline model to feature multiple risky stocks and positive risk
premium. With multiple stocks, we show that managers with higher interim performance
invest in more volatile stocks in equilibrium. For the case of a single risky stock with
positive risk premium, we demonstrate that, as with zero risk premium, interim winners
invest in the stock while interim losers invest in the bond, whereby the only eﬀect of the
risk premium is that the mass of interim winners goes up due to the stock becoming more
attractive. Analyzing an example where multiple stocks, risk premium, and heterogeneous
risk aversion are jointly present reveals that the equilibrium outcome is similar to that in
the heterogenous risk aversion generalization, the only diﬀerence being that the more risk
tolerant managers now invest in a large number of stocks. In summary, our main insights and
empirical predictions in the baseline model remain valid with above generalizations: interim
winners (losers) increase (decrease) the riskiness of their portfolios.
To better understand the role of portfolio constraints behind our implications, and to
also see whether our results may readily be applicable to hedge funds, which are largely
unconstrained, we analyze how the behavior of risk averse managers is aﬀected once the
constraints are lifted. We ﬁnd that when the ﬂows convexity is dominant, our main result
still obtains: interim winners choose more volatile portfolios than interim losers. However,
for relatively risk averse managers whose behavior is not much aﬀected by convexity, our
analysis reveals that their portfolio volatility can be insensitive to or even decreasing with
interim performance, depending on the economic setting.
Finally, we generalize our baseline model to two trading periods, corresponding to start
and middle of the year. We here demonstrate that the diﬀerence in managers’ interim
performance at mid-year arises endogenously since the managers, though identical, choose
diﬀerent equilibrium portfolios at year-start. In particular, we ﬁnd that the majority of
the managers invest in the stock while the remainder invest in the bond, and also that the
fraction of stockholders increases with the stock volatility. Since in this extended model
trading happens more than once, we are also able to look at the trading volume implications
3of tournament behavior, which have not been explored in the extant literature. Here, our
analysis leads to a novel prediction that the mid-year trading volume is inversely related to
the mid-year stock return.
1.1. Related Literature
Although the results of our baseline model and its generalizations are in contrast to the
widely-used “intuitive” tournament hypothesis, the predictions of our model are supported by
several empirical studies. Busse (2001) ﬁnds “no evidence that mid-year losers increase end
of year risk more than winners. If anything, the results indicate the opposite.” Employing
a diﬀerent dataset, Qiu (2003) documents a similar pattern that “mid-year loser funds have
less incentives to increase their funds risk relative to mid-year winner funds.” Relying on the
“intuitive” tournament hypothesis, both Busse and Qiu seem to view their results as being
at odds with the tournament behavior. Our analysis reveals that their ﬁndings are in fact
consistent with a rational tournament model.
The most related to our theoretical work are Goriaev, Palomino, and Prat (2003), Taylor
(2003), and Chen and Pennacchi (2009) who look at the eﬀect of interim performance on
managers’ risk taking. A key diﬀerence is that both Goriaev et al. and Taylor look at a
strategic setting with two managers, an interim winner and a loser, and characterize their
behavior by appealing to Nash equilibrium. From the viewpoint of the actual fund industry
comprised by hundreds of funds, the settings in these papers correspond to a scenario where
all interim winners or losers cooperatively decide on their investment strategy. In ours,
managers choose their portfolios alone and are not aﬀected by strategic motives as they
recognize they are competing against a large number of managers. Being built on diﬀerent
premises, the predictions of these papers are considerably diﬀerent. In Goriaev et al., an
interim loser takes on more risk than a winner, the opposite of our result. Moreover, at
year-start both their managers choose the same level of risk, while our managers, though
identical, choose diﬀerent levels of risk. In Taylor, both managers resort to mixed strategies
in equilibrium as each tries to “confuse” the opponent, and hence only with some probability
an interim winner chooses a riskier strategy than a loser. Chen and Pennacchi (2009) diﬀer
from our work in that they only consider suﬃciently risk averse managers whose risk aversion
dominates the fund ﬂows convexity, and such managers who are unconstrained in their
4portfolio choice. Their model does not generate a clear-cut empirical prediction as to how
portfolio volatility is related to interim performance – they ﬁnd that the relation can go either
way. Finally, the trading volume implications of tournament behavior are not investigated
in Goriaev et al., Taylor, and Chen and Pennacchi.
Also related is the literature investigating other aspects pertaining to a fund tournament.
Palomino (2005) studies the eﬀect of relative performance concerns on the degree of compe-
tition, measured by the number of competing funds, and also on the trading strategies. Li
and Tiwari (2008) focus on the welfare implications of tournament behavior. Loranth and
Sciubba (2006) investigate how the riskiness of fund strategies is aﬀected by the (threat of)
entry by new funds. Basak and Makarov (2009) study strategic interactions among a small
number of top-performing funds.
Our paper also contributes to the literature establishing that convexities in managers’
objectives with relative concerns have important and often unexpected implications for the
volatility of optimal portfolios. Examples are Carpenter (2000), Basak, Pavlova, and Shapiro
(2007), Panageas and Westerﬁeld (2009), Cuoco and Kaniel (2010). Basak et al., Cuoco and
Kaniel, as well as Chen and Pennacchi, also note the point made in our paper that fund
managers’ behavior can be directed towards increasing the tracking error volatility. However,
these works do not investigate the link between interim performance and portfolio volatility
or the trading volume implications. Models with relative concerns and no convexities have
also been useful in explaining a number of empirical regularities (Abel (1990), DeMarzo,
Kaniel, and Kremer (2007, 2008)).
More broadly, our paper is related to the work on tournaments in other environments
(Lazear and Rosen (1981), Green and Stokey (1983), Bhattacharya and Guasch (1988),
Taylor (1995), Zwiebel (1995), among many others). It is worth noting that this literature
often looks at “winner-take-all” reward functions, while in the context of a mutual fund
tournament the rewards (i.e., money ﬂows) accrue to a large number of managers. Huang,
Wei, and Yan (2007) formally show that such a reward function arises in equilibrium due to
information acquisition and participation costs faced by retail investors.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the baseline economy, and Section
3 characterizes the equilibrium in this economy. Section 4 generalizes the baseline model
to accommodate risk aversion, while Section 5 accommodates multiple risky stocks and
5positive risk premium. Section 6 demonstrates how diﬀerential interim performance arises
endogenously, and also investigates the trading volume implications of tournament behavior.
Section 7 concludes. The Appendix contains all proofs.
2. Baseline Economy
In this Section, we describe our baseline economy where we intentionally abstract away from
some pertinent features of a fund tournament (incorporated later in Sections 4–6). With
such a stylized model, we are able to characterize equilibrium in closed form and describe
our main insights in the clearest way possible.
The economy is populated by a continuum of risk neutral fund managers, indexed by i ∈
[0,1]. Hereafter, we use the terms “fund”, “manager”, and “fund manager” interchangeably.
Financial investment opportunities are given by a riskless bond and a risky stock. The bond
return is normalized to 1, while the stock return x is normally distributed with mean 1 and
variance σ2.
There are two time periods with no discounting, t = 1 and t = 2, which we refer to as
mid-year and year-end, respectively.2 At time 1, manager i inherits a certain return r0(i)
accumulated between the year-start and mid-year which we label as manager i’s interim
performance. Without loss of generality, we assume that all managers have a unit wealth
at year start, implying that manager i’s time 1 wealth equals her interim performance r0(i).
In the current economy, the diﬀerence in managers’ interim performance is exogenously
assumed, however Section 6 formally establishes that this diﬀerence arises endogenously as
a result of the managers’ choosing diﬀerent portfolios at year-start. We assume that r0(i) is
continuous and increasing in index i; that is, we assign a higher index i to a manager with
a higher interim performance.
Manager i chooses a portfolio strategy α(i), where α(i) denotes the fraction of wealth
invested in the stock at time 1. The managers choose their strategies at the same time,
and hence whether a manager is able to observe the other managers’ strategies or not is
inconsequential in our setting. We assume no-short-sale constraints on both assets, i.e.,
2Year-end is an important date since around this time many popular fund rankings are published in the
media, and based on them households choose funds for investing money.
6α(i) ∈ [0,1] for all i ∈ [0,1], as observed in the mutual fund industry (Almazan, Brown,
Carlson, and Chapman (2004)). Manager i’s performance at time 2 , R(i), is given by
R(i) = r
0(i)(α(i)x + 1 − α(i)). (1)
The industry performance ¯ R is deﬁned as the average of all managers’ performances R(i),
and so is obtained by integrating the right-hand side of equation (1) over i ∈ [0,1]. This
yields after some algebra
¯ R = ¯ r












Given the form of expression (2), the industry performance ¯ R is equal to the performance of
a hypothetical fund whose interim performance is ¯ r0 and whose portfolio strategy is ¯ α, where
¯ α and ¯ r0 are as given in equation (3). Henceforth, we refer to ¯ α as the industry portfolio
strategy, the fraction of industry wealth invested in the stock.
We formulate tournament behavior by postulating that fund i receives money ﬂows at
year-end depending on its relative performance R(i) − ¯ R via an increasing and convex fund
ﬂows function f(·), which is consistent with empirical ﬁndings (Chevalier and Ellison (1997),
Sirri and Tufano (1998)). We assume that managers have common knowledge of the function
f(·). Consequently, manager i’s year-end wealth W(i) is given by W(i) = R(i)+f(R(i)− ¯ R),
which after substituting expressions (1)–(2) yields
W(i) = r
0(i)(α(i)x + 1 − α(i)) + f(r
0(i)(α(i)x + 1 − α(i)) − ¯ r
0(¯ αx + 1 − ¯ α)). (4)
When choosing her portfolio, each manager conjectures that the industry performance
¯ R has a certain distribution, being aware that her choice does not aﬀect this distribution
since she is atomistic. In equilibrium, it must be the case that aggregating over individual
portfolios leads to the distribution of ¯ R as conjectured by every manager. Throughout the
paper, a variable with a hatˆdenotes a best response quantity, and a variable with an asterisk
∗ an equilibrium quantity. From (2), the distribution of ¯ R is completely characterized by the
7industry portfolio strategy ¯ α, and so an equilibrium in our economy is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 1. An equilibrium is a pair (α∗(i), ¯ α∗) such that that the following two conditions
are satisﬁed.
(i) Best response condition. Given an industry portfolio strategy ¯ α∗, α∗(i) maximizes
manager i’s expected wealth
α
∗(i) = arg max
α(i)∈[0,1]
E [W(i)], (5)
where W(i) is as given in (4).
(ii) Aggregation condition. Aggregating individual portfolio strategies α∗(i) yields the






¯ r0 . (6)
While our main focus is on equilibrium, we will also ﬁnd it helpful to describe the man-
agers’ best response strategies. For a given industry strategy ¯ α ∈ [0,1], manager i’s best
response ˆ α(i) is a solution of the best response condition (5), i.e., ˆ α(i) maximizes manager i’s
expected wealth (4). Note that the ﬁrst term on the right-hand of (4) is zero in expectation
since the expected stock and bond returns are equal. As a result, in our baseline economy
we are able to easily isolate the eﬀect of tournament incentives since the managers’ behavior
is driven purely by the second “tournament” term f(·) in (4).
3. Equilibrium
In this Section, we analytically characterize the managers’ best response and equilibrium
portfolio strategies in the baseline economy. We specify an exponential form for the fund
ﬂows function f(·), thus satisfying the above requirements that for f(·) to be plausible it
needs to be increasing and convex. In particular, we let
f(R(i) − ¯ R) = exp(c(R(i) − ¯ R)), (7)
8where c > 0 controls the convexity of f. In fact, all our results hold for a much larger class
of ﬂow functions (see Remark 1), and it is only for notational convenience that we consider
the simple speciﬁcation (7). Proposition 1 presents the managers’ best response strategies.
Proposition 1. For a given industry portfolio strategy ¯ α ∈ [0,1], manager i’s best response





1, r0(i) ≥ 2¯ α¯ r0,
0, r0(i) < 2¯ α¯ r0.
(8)
Proposition 1 reveals that there exists a threshold value of interim performance, 2¯ α¯ r0,
which divides all funds into two categories. Those whose interim performance is above the
threshold, the interim winners, invest fully in the risky stock. The remainder, the interim
losers, invest in the bond. This result is at odds with the tournament hypothesis, ﬁrst
formulated by BHS and subsequently used in many other studies.
The intuition behind our result is as follows. The convexity of fund ﬂows with respect
to relative performance leads to gambling behavior, whereby managers seek to maximize
the tracking error volatility, i.e., the volatility of relative performance R(i) − ¯ R. Given the
convexity, the tracking error volatility is maximized by either investing fully in the stock or
in the bond. Suppose that manager i invests in the stock, and thus maximizes her portfolio
volatility. This has the following two eﬀects. First, investing in the stock induces a positive
correlation between her own return R(i) and the industry return ¯ R,3 which has a negative
eﬀect on the tracking error volatility. Second, investing in the stock maximizes the volatility
of her own return R(i) which has a positive eﬀect on the tracking error volatility. The
ﬁrst negative eﬀect may well be dominant, and so maximizing the portfolio volatility is not
synonymous to maximizing the tracking error volatility, as also noted in existing studies
(Chen and Pennacchi (2009), Cuoco and Kaniel (2010)). Since the volatility of R(i) is the
product of manager i’s interim performance r0(i) and the stock volatility σ, the magnitude of
the second positive eﬀect increases with interim performance. As a result, when a manager’s
interim performance is high enough, the second eﬀect more than oﬀsets the ﬁrst negative
eﬀect, and so interim winners’ best response strategy is to invest in the stock. For interim
3We here disregard the knife-edge scenario where all managers invest in the bond, in which case the
industry return ¯ R is completely riskless (¯ α = 0). Such a scenario can never occur in equilibrium.
9losers, the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates, implying that their best response is to invest in the bond.
From the above discussion, we see that one of the mechanisms behind our result is that
fund managers have incentives to increase the tracking error volatility. This mechanism is
also present and noted in previous works (Basak, Pavlova, and Shapiro (2007), Chen and
Pennacchi (2009), Cuoco and Kaniel (2010)). However, these studies do not investigate how
a manager’s portfolio volatility depends on interim performance, which is the main focus of
our paper. To complete the analysis of the tournament, Proposition 2 fully characterizes the
equilibrium in the baseline economy.
Proposition 2. The equilibrium industry portfolio strategy ¯ α∗ and the equilibrium interim






¯ r0 , r
0(i
∗) = 2¯ α
∗¯ r
0, (9)
where the solution exists and is unique. The equilibrium threshold r0(i∗) lies strictly within
the range of values of r0(i). The equilibrium portfolio strategies α∗(i) are obtained by setting
¯ α = ¯ α∗ in the best response expression (8).
Proposition 2 demonstrates that in equilibrium there exist managers (with positive mass)
both above and below the interim performance threshold r0(i∗). This implies that managers
cannot all invest in the stock and all be interim winners, nor can they all invest in the bond
and all be interim losers. The reason is that if all managers invested in the same asset, each
individual manager would be able to increase her tracking error volatility by switching to the
other asset. Proposition 2 also reveals that the interim performance threshold r0(i∗) depends
on the shape of the interim performance relation r0(i), as evident from equation (9). That
is, the threshold fund is determined by the realized cross-section of interim performances,
and so does not in general coincide with the median fund as assumed in BHS and other
works. Hence, our model generates a novel prediction concerning the fractions of managers
choosing high volatile versus low volatile strategies at mid year: the higher the threshold
i∗ is, the lower the share of managers who opt for high volatility. A possible way to test
this implication is as follows. Given panel data containing information about fund strategies
and mid-year performances over a number of years, calculate for each year the following two
10variables: i) the threshold i∗, computed by solving condition (9) from the observed interim
performances, and ii) the fraction of managers who increase their portfolio volatilities over
the second year-half. Our model predicts a negative correlation between these two variables.
Remark 1. More general ﬂow-performance speciﬁcations. All the results of this Section
remain valid for a much larger class of ﬂow performance speciﬁcations than the exponential
speciﬁcation (7). In particular, suppose that the ﬂow function is a linear combination of
exponential basis functions:
f(R(i) − ¯ R) =
J X
j=1
aj exp(cj(R(i) − ¯ R)), (10)
where J > 0 is an integer and aj > 0,cj > 0 for all j = 1,...,J. Looking at each individual
term in the sum of the right-hand side of equation (10), its maximand is given by expression
(8), as proved in Proposition 1. Since aj > 0, j = 1,..., J, the maximand of the sum equals
the maximand of the individual terms, and so is also given by (8). Hence, the managers’
best responses (Proposition 1) remain the same under speciﬁcation (10), and so does the
equilibrium (Proposition 2). Moreover, since J, aj, and cj are arbitrary positive numbers
(the only restriction is that J is an integer), speciﬁcation (10) potentially spans a large set of
increasing convex ﬂow-performance functions. Indeed, Vasicek and Fong (1982) demonstrate
that in the context of yield curve modelling, exponential spline ﬁtting “exhibits ... suﬃcient
ﬂexibility to ﬁt a wide variety of shapes of the term structure.” This suggests that our
speciﬁcation (10) can generate a rich set of possible ﬂow-performance functions. Note that
since the exponential basis functions are smooth, speciﬁcation (10) may fail to adequately
approximate functions exhibiting kinks. In Section 4, we present an example that shows
that our main predictions are still valid for an empirically plausible fund ﬂow function with
a kink.
4. Risk Aversion and Convexity of Fund Flows
In this Section, we extend our baseline model of Sections 2–3 to incorporate managerial risk
aversion. Since a manager’s year-end wealth (4) depends on both her own performance and
11relative performance, she in general accounts for both when choosing her portfolio.4 However,
to provide some basic intuition on the kind of incentives that drive risk averse managers,
we focus on the latter consideration – the desire to maximize relative performance, and
hence fund ﬂows. As discussed in Section 3, absent risk aversion the implication of the fund
ﬂows convexity is that each manager seeks to diverge from the industry-average return so
as to increase her expected inﬂows. If convexity were absent, on the other hand, then risk
averse managers would want to mimic the industry-average portfolio so as to minimize their
tracking error volatility.5 With both features – risk aversion and convexity – now being
present, it is mainly the interplay of these two mechanisms which determines the patterns
of managerial risk taking.
To provide a uniﬁed analysis of possible behaviors resulting from this interplay, we con-
sider a setting with two types of managers who diﬀer in risk aversion, type-L (low risk
aversion) and type-H (high risk aversion); the economy is otherwise as in Section 2. Intu-
itively, the behavior of type-L managers is going to be primarily driven by the convexity of
fund ﬂows while the behavior of type-H managers by their risk aversion. If all managers were
of the same type, either type-L or type-H, then their equilibrium portfolios would be similar
to the equilibrium portfolios of the corresponding type of managers in the heterogenous risk
aversion setting described below. Apart from generality, considering managers with diﬀerent
risk aversion is consistent with Koijen (2008), who ﬁnds substantial heterogeneity in atti-
tudes towards risk across mutual fund managers. We assume that both types of managers





where γ > 0 is the relative risk aversion coeﬃcient. The risk aversion of type-L and type-H
managers is γ = γL and γ = γH, respectively, with γL < γH. Since this richer model with risk
4As noted in Section 2, in the baseline economy the managers’ behavior is driven purely by the desire
to increase relative performance, i.e., second term f(·) in expression (4). With risk aversion, a manager’s
objective is a concave function over (4), and so the ﬁrst term in (4) does not disappear from the managers’
optimization, implying that managers also care about increasing their absolute performance.
5Indeed, given that the mean stock and bond returns are equal, the managers cannot change their own
expected portfolio return, and hence cannot change their expected relative performance. They can only
control the volatility of their relative performance, and so they aim to minimize this volatility since the
combination of risk aversion and non-convex fund ﬂows leads to a concave objective function over relative
performance.
12aversion turns out to not be tractable analytically, we consider two examples with diﬀerent,
empirically plausible fund ﬂow functions f(·), and solve for the equilibrium numerically.6
Leading Example 1. Exponential ﬂow speciﬁcation. We set γL = 1 (i.e., logarithmic
utility) and γH = 5, implying an empirically reasonable average risk aversion of three. The
exponential ﬂow function is given by equation (7) for which the convexity parameter c is
set at c = 4, meaning that a 10% excess return leads to a 50% inﬂow of new investments
into the fund. This is broadly consistent with Chevalier and Ellison (1997) who ﬁnd that
a mutual fund is expected to “grow by approximately 55 percent if its return is 10 points
greater than the market return.” We abandon the assumption of Section 2 that the stock
return x is normally distributed, and assume that x is lognormally distributed with mean
1 and volatility 10.5%, corresponding to volatility 15% per annum. Retaining normality
would lead to a degenerate model with essentially one asset, the riskless bond.7 Each type
of manager has unit mass, and we use the same index i,i ∈ [0,1] to refer to both types. We
assume that the interim performance within each type is uniformly spread between 0.9 and
1.1, i.e., the interim performance of type-L and type-H managers with index i is given by
r0(i) = 0.9 + 0.2 ∗ i.
We solve numerically for the equilibrium portfolios of type-L and type-H managers, α∗
L(i)
and α∗
H(i), respectively, and present the results in Figure 1. Looking at the relatively risk
tolerant type-L managers, we see that in equilibrium interim winners invest in the stock
while interim losers invest in the bond, analogous to the equilibrium in our baseline setting
of Section 3. The reason is that the eﬀect of fund ﬂows convexity dominates the eﬀect of
risk aversion, in which case risk averse managers behave similarly to risk neutral baseline
managers. The relatively risk averse type-H managers choose almost the same portfolio
regardless of their interim performance (the slope of the dashed line in Figure 1 is positive
but close to zero). For these managers, risk aversion outweighs the convexity of fund ﬂows,
6We implement the following approach to compute the equilibrium. For each possible value of the industry
strategy α ∈ [0,1], we ﬁnd the optimal strategies of type-L and type-H managers, α∗
L(i) and α∗
H(i), which
maximize the respective expected utilities. Then, we substitute these optimal α∗
L(i) and α∗
H(i) into equation
(3) to compute the industry strategy ¯ α as implied by the managers portfolios. The equilibrium obtains when
α = ¯ α, and the equilibrium industry strategy is ¯ α∗ = α = ¯ α. As we already know the managers’ optimal
strategies for each α ∈ [0,1], the equilibrium strategies are the optimal strategies obtained for α = ¯ α∗.
7 Indeed, no CRRA manager would want to invest in the risky stock with normally distributed return,
as doing so may lead to negative wealth over which CRRA utility is not well-deﬁned. Our main predictions










Figure 1: Equilibrium portfolios under heterogeneous risk aversion. The equilib-
rium portfolios of type-L (solid line) and type-H (dashed line) managers. Their relative risk
aversion coeﬃcients are γL = 1 and γH = 5, respectively. The remaining parameter values
are as presented in Example 1.
and so they are not driven by the desire to win the tournament and get inﬂows. Consequently,
a manager’s interim standing in the competition for ﬂows has little eﬀect on her equilibrium
behavior.
Solving the model for diﬀerent risk aversions γL and γH reveals that we obtain a similar
equilibrium as in Figure 1 as long as γL < 1.2 and γH > 1.2 (1.2 is obtained by rounding
the actual threshold to one decimal). That is, given the level of convexity c = 4 in the
leading Example 1, the fund ﬂows convexity dominates the eﬀect of a given risk aversion γ
when γ < 1.2, and is dominated by risk aversion when γ > 1.2. Though inconsequential
to our main message, we note that when γL > 1 and the range of interim performance is
considerably wide (as quantiﬁed below for several values of γL), we may potentially have
the relation between portfolio volatility and interim performance for type-L managers to not
fully coincide with that in Example 1 (solid line Figure 1). In particular, type-L managers
with extremely high or low interim performance may ﬁnd that most realizations of their
terminal wealth are outside the convex region of their objective functions, and so they would
choose portfolios close to those of type-H managers.8 This only happens when the diﬀerence
in interim performance between the best and worst performing managers (i.e., r0(1)−r0(0))
is higher than 1.5 (15000 basis points) when γL = 1.05, higher than 1.1 when γL = 1.1, higher
than 0.5 when γL = 1.15, and higher than 0.3 (3000 bps) when γL = 1.2. The higher the risk
aversion γL the smaller the eﬀect of the convexity on the behavior of type-L managers, and
8The reason why this behavior occurs for γL > 1 is a technical one: CRRA utility function is bounded
when γL > 1, implying that the composite function u(f(·)) can be locally but never globally convex however
high the convexity of f(·) is.
14so the critical level of the performance diﬀerential r0(1) − r0(0) (under which the outcome
is as in the baseline model) decreases in γL.
To better understand how the risk aversion threshold depends on the shape of the ﬂow-
performance relationship, we consider here only the following (slightly more general) ﬂow-
performance relation
f(R(i) − ¯ R) = aexp(c(R(i) − ¯ R)), (12)
where the scaling parameter a > 0 captures the proportional change of money ﬂows occurring
at all levels of relative performance.9 Figure 2 depicts how the risk aversion threshold
depends on parameters c and a. Figure 2(a) reveals that the risk aversion threshold is
positively related to the convexity parameter c, consistent with the above discussion of the
interplay between convexity and risk aversion. Combining this result with Chevalier and
Ellison (1997) who ﬁnd that the ﬂow-performance relation is more convex for young funds
than for old funds, we get that the tournament behavior suggested in our analysis is likely
to be more pronounced among young funds.10 From Figure 2(b), it turns out that the
threshold monotonically tends to unity as the scaling parameter a increases, and so whether
the threshold increases or decreases depends on whether it is above or below the pivotal level
of one (corresponding to logarithmic objective function). This result resonates with other
portfolio choice applications where the case of logarithmic utility often acts as a pivotal case.
For relatively high convexities c = 4 and c = 6, the risk aversion threshold is higher than
one, and so it decreases with a (solid and dashed lines in Figure 2(b)). For relatively low
convexity c = 2, the risk aversion threshold is lower than one, and so it increases with a
(dotted line in Figure 2(b)).
Solving Example 1 under more general ﬂow speciﬁcations of the form (10) leads to equi-
libria that are similar to the equilibrium with the baseline speciﬁcation (7) depicted in Figure
9Since speciﬁcation (12) is a special case of (10), all predictions of the baseline model remain valid under
(12), as explained in Remark 1. As for the risk aversion case, we calibrate (12) to match Chevalier and Ellison
(1997), which yields a = 1.15 and c = 3, and then solve the risk averse Example 1 under this calibration.
The resulting equilibrium portfolios of type-L and type-H managers remain as depicted in Figure 1.
10Indeed, from Figure 2(a) a higher ﬂows convexity results in a higher risk aversion threshold for young
funds, and so the range of risk aversions for which a manager exhibits type-L behavior is wider for young
funds. Provided that the cross-sectional distribution of risk aversions across young managers is the same
or relatively similar to that across old managers, the higher threshold implies that the fraction of type-L
managers is higher among young funds than old funds, and so young funds are expected to more strongly



















Figure 2: Risk aversion threshold. The risk aversion threshold for varying levels of the
convexity c and scaling a parameters. In panel (a), the scaling parameter is a = 1. In panel
(b), dotted line corresponds to c = 2, dashed line to c = 4, solid line to c = 6. The remaining
parameter values are as presented in Example 1.
1.11 To investigate the robustness of our results to another plausible ﬂow function that can-
not be generated by speciﬁcation (10), in Example 2 we consider an option-like speciﬁcation
with a kink, which is consistent with the evidence of Sirri and Tufano (1998).
Example 2. Flow speciﬁcation with a kink. Sirri and Tufano (1998) ﬁnd that “the performance-
ﬂow relationship documented here...gives fund complexes a payout that resembles a call op-
tion.” According to their evidence, the ﬂow-performance relationship is almost ﬂat when the
excess return is not in the top quintile, and increases at rate 1.47 when the excess return is in
the top quintile (Table 3 in Sirri and Tufano). Accordingly, we consider a ﬂow speciﬁcation
f(R(i) − ¯ R) that is ﬂat until relative performance R(i) − ¯ R reaches a threshold, beyond
which it is linearly increasing in R(i) − ¯ R:




1 R(i) − ¯ R < 0.1,
1 + 1.5 ∗ (R(i) − ¯ R − 0.1) R(i) − ¯ R ≥ 0.1.
(13)
All other parameters are as in Example 1. Solving the model numerically for various levels
of risk aversions γL and γH, we ﬁnd that the structure of the ensuing equilibria is similar to
that in Example 1, in that there are the same two types of behavior depending on whether
11In particular, we consider all possible ﬂow functions obtained by setting J = 3 in (10), letting a1, a2,
and a3 to take on values from the grid [0.2, 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, 3], and c1, c2, and c3 to take on values from the
grid [1, 2, ..., 7]. Solving for equilibrium under each calibration yields that there exists a certain risk aversion
threshold such that portfolio volatilities of managers below the threshold are as in our baseline model, while
the volatilities of managers above the threshold are virtually insensitive to interim performance.
16the manager’s risk aversion is above or below a risk aversion threshold. One diﬀerence
from Example 1 is that the threshold now equals ﬁve while in Example 1 it equals 1.2,
though both thresholds play the same role and have similar properties. That the threshold
is higher now means that the range of γL and γH for which the equilibrium outcomes under
risk aversion and risk neutrality are similar is considerably wider under an option-like ﬂows
function (13) than under the baseline function (7). The reason is that speciﬁcation (13)
features a kink, around which convexity is relatively high, while speciﬁcation (7) is smooth,
implying a comparatively low convexity.
From the above discussion, we have that if we were to depict the equilibrium for the
heterogenous risk aversion setting of Example 1, with γL = 1 and γH = 5, then the shape of
the relation between interim performance and risk taking would be similar for type-L and
type-H managers as neither type would be above the threshold.12 Given this, for illustrative
purposes we assume away the heterogeneity and set γL = γH = 3. Figure 3 presents the
resulting equilibrium portfolios. We see that the equilibrium outcome is as in the risk-neutral






Figure 3: Equilibrium portfolios under the option-like ﬂow speciﬁcation. The
equilibrium portfolios of CRRA managers with relative risk aversion γ = 3. Other parameter
values are as described in Example 2. The plot is typical for other risk aversion coeﬃcients,
γ ∈ (0,5].
In summary, while the equilibria in the two settings – baseline without risk aversion and
this Section with risk aversion – are somewhat diﬀerent, the empirical implications are in fact
very similar. Namely, dividing the managers into two groups based on interim performance,
12If we set γH to be higher than ﬁve, then the equilibrium portfolios of type-H managers would be virtually
insensitive to interim performance, similarly to the corresponding result in Example 1 (dashed line in Figure
1).
17both models predict that the portfolio volatility of interim winners is higher than that of
interim losers. The presence of managers with relatively high risk aversion can only make
this result less pronounced since these managers’ portfolios exhibit little sensitivity to interim
performance.
4.1. Role of Portfolio Constraints
Given our focus on understanding the mutual fund tournament, for the bulk of our paper
we assume no-short-sale constraints since such constraints are prevalent in the mutual fund
industry. Indeed, Almazan, Brown, Carlson, and Chapman (2004) document that 70% of
mutual funds reported to the SEC that short-selling is not permitted under their investment
policy, and that among the remaining 30%, only 3% in fact engaged in short-selling. From
Figure 1, we observe that the constraint binds for type-L managers (solid line) and does not
bind for type-H managers (dashed line), and also that the volatility-interim performance
relation for “constraint-bound” type-L managers is notably diﬀerent from that for “uncon-
strained” type-H managers. This prompts us to take a closer look at the role of portfolio
constraints in our setting, which is of interest not only from from a theoretical perspective
but also since it can shed some light on whether our results may be readily applicable to the
hedge fund industry where the managers are largely unconstrained.
With risk aversion present, there are three forms of a manager’s objective function that
may arise in our model: convex (as for type-L managers in Example 1), concave (as for
type-H managers in Example 1), or locally convex (as for managers in Example 2). As
established above, under a no-short-sale constraint managers with convex objectives behave
similarly to those with locally convex objectives (compare the solid plot in Figure 1 with the
plot in Figure 3). When the constraint is now lifted, convex and locally convex objectives no
longer lead to similar behaviors. In particular, while an unconstrained manager with a locally
convex objective function chooses a bounded position in the risky stock as the risk aversion
is dominant outside the convexity region, an unconstrained manager with a convex objective
would seek an unbounded position in the stock. Hence, we would not obtain an equilibrium
if some unconstrained managers in the economy have convex objectives (as in Example 1).
There are, however, several considerations absent in our model that may prevent actual
fund managers from taking very big gambles even when the managers are able to short, e.g.,
18reputational concerns.13 Given our focus, we do not introduce such additional features into
our analysis, and so describe the unconstrained behavior of managers with concave or locally
convex objectives only.
We now look at how the managers’ equilibrium portfolios in Examples 1 and 2 are aﬀected
once we lift the no-short-sale constraints. From the above, in the unconstrained Example
1 we assume that all managers are of type-H and have the same risk aversion γH = 5,
meaning that the economy is populated by managers with concave objectives. The resulting
equilibrium is simple (and does not warrant a separate ﬁgure): all managers invest fully in the
bond, implying that their portfolio volatility is not sensitive to interim performance. Given
that the risk aversion dominates the ﬂows convexity, the managers are essentially ignoring
the tournament incentives created by fund ﬂows and so invest in the bond as the risky stock
oﬀers no premium for risk. As demonstrated later, the managers with concave objectives do
not choose the same portfolio volatility in an economy with positive risk premium (see the
unconstrained Example 3 and Figure 6 in Section 5).
Turning to Example 2, we are able to describe the equilibrium portfolios with no con-
straints since the managers’ objectives are locally convex. Figure 4 depicts manager i’s
equilibrium portfolio volatility, σ∗(i), as a function of her interim performance, r0(i). First,
from Figure 4 we see that when short-selling is allowed, some managers do use the opportu-
nity to take short positions, as evident from the volatility of interim winners being around
15% while the maximum volatility under a no-short sale constraint equals the stock return
volatility and so is 10.5%. Figure 4 also reveals that all managers can be divided into interim
losers and interim winners, with the interim winners choosing a higher portfolio volatility
than the losers, implying that the empirical predictions of the unconstrained Example 2
are similar to those when the constraint is present (Figure 3). The portfolio volatility of
the unconstrained interim losers is zero, as in the constrained Example 2. For the uncon-
strained interim winners, however, the relation between interim performance and volatility
is hump-shaped, unlike the ﬂat relation obtained under the constraint. The intuition for
the hump-shape is that the winners in the middle of the convexity region choose the highest
volatility as they have the highest incentives to leave the region, while for winners closer to
13Brown, Goetzmann, and Park (2001) argue that there is “a clear tension between risk taking and the
desire to develop or preserve a reputation.” Supporting this argument, their empirical analysis reveals that






Figure 4: Equilibrium unconstrained portfolio volatilities under the option-like
ﬂow speciﬁcation. The equilibrium portfolio volatilities of risk averse managers when a no-
short-sale constraint is absent. The economic setting and parameter values are as described
in Example 2.
the boundaries of the region the corresponding incentives are weaker, and so they choose
lower portfolio volatilities.
5. Multiple Stocks and Risk Premium
In this Section, we investigate the robustness of our results to the case of multiple risky
assets and positive risk premium, and also as an ultimate robustness check we look at a
general case when these two features are combined with heterogenous risk aversion. We
generalize the setting of Section 2 as follows. The investment opportunities are now given
by N uncorrelated risky stocks, where N ≥ 1, and a riskless bond.14 The return on stock
k, k = 1,...,N, denoted by xk, has mean µ ≥ 1 and volatility σk, where σ1 < σ2 < ... < σN
meaning that the stocks are sorted by volatility. For notational convenience, we may refer
to the bond as stock 0, and so µ0 = 1 and σ0 = 0. The assumption that all risky stocks
have the same expected return µ ensures that our model is close in spirit to the tournament
hypothesis discussed in the literature.15 Up until Example 3, we assume that the risky assets
are normally distributed. We let αk(i), k = 1,...,N, denote manager i’s fraction of wealth
14The subsequent analysis remains fully applicable if stocks were correlated. Indeed, we can always combine
the stocks into uncorrelated portfolios and treat these portfolios as individual stocks. The number of such
uncorrelated portfolios equals the number of sources of uncertainty in the economy.
15In particular, from the discussion in Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) and Chevalier and Ellison (1997),
the main driving force behind portfolio rebalancing in response to interim performance is the desire to change
the portfolio volatility, and not the portfolio expected return. Given this, allowing for diﬀerential risk premia
across risky stocks would distance our theoretical framework from empirical works.
20invested in stock k, and σ(i) manager i’s portfolio volatility. As before, a variable with a
hatˆ , an asterisk ∗, and an overbar¯ represents a best response quantity, an equilibrium
quantity, and an aggregate quantity, respectively.
Following the same steps as those leading to expression (2), we obtain that the industry
performance ¯ R that enters into the fund ﬂow function (7) is now
¯ R = ¯ r
0
hXN
















The equilibrium with multiple risky stocks is deﬁned as in Deﬁnition 1 of Section 2 with the
scalars α∗(i) and ¯ α∗ now being replaced by the vectors (α∗
1(i), ..., α∗
N(i)) and (¯ α∗
1,..., ¯ α∗
N),
respectively. The equilibrium can be characterized analytically either when there are multiple
risky stocks but with zero risk premium or when the risk premium is positive but there is
one risky stock. Proposition 3 reports the corresponding best responses and equilibrium
outcomes.
Proposition 3. In the case of multiple risky stocks with zero risk premium (N > 1,µ = 1),
for given industry strategies ¯ αk, k = 1,...,N, the best response of manager i is to fully invest
all her wealth in stock k(i), where k(i) is determined from









and where ¯ αk and ¯ r0 are as given in (15). In equilibrium, the managers’ portfolio volatility
σ∗(i) is (weakly) increasing in the index i and, hence, in the interim performance r0(i).
That is, the higher a manager’s interim performance is the more volatile stock she holds in
equilibrium.
In the special case of a single risky stock with positive risk premium (N = 1,µ > 1), for





1, r0(i) ≥ 2¯ α¯ r0 − 2(1 + c)r0(i)(µ − 1)/(cσ)2
0, otherwise.
(17)
Manager i’s equilibrium portfolio α∗(i) is obtained by substituting the equilibrium industry






¯ r0 , r
0(i
∗) = 2¯ α
∗¯ r
0 − 2(1 + c)r
0(i)(µ − 1)/(cσ)
2. (18)
Proposition 3 reveals that our main prediction, that managers with higher interim per-
formance take on more risk, is robust to the two generalizations considered. Under multiple
risky stocks and zero risk premium, the managers’ best responses admit an analytical rep-
resentation (16), just as the best responses in our baseline model of Section 3 (see equation
(8). However, unlike Section 3, it is not straightforward to see how equilibrium portfolios
depend on interim performance by just eyeballing expression (16), and so we need to con-
duct an equilibrium analysis. Although a full characterization of equilibrium in closed form
is not possible, as stated in Proposition 3, we are able to prove that in equilibrium managers
with higher interim performance r0(i) choose portfolios with (weakly) higher volatility σ∗(i),
which is consistent with the predictions of the baseline model. Under the single risky stock
case with positive risk premium, the best response equation (17) reveals that the interim
winners invest in the risky stock while the remaining managers invest in the bond, which is
as in the baseline model. Comparing with equation (9) describing the baseline equilibrium
with no risk premium, we observe the presence of a negative term in the right-hand side of
the second equation in (18), implying that the threshold i∗ is now lower with positive risk
premium. Hence, a positive risk premium increases the number of managers who invest in
the stock, which is the consequence of the stock becoming relatively more attractive when
it commands a positive risk premium.16
16Inspecting (17)–(18), we see that all managers may invest in the risky stock provided that the stock
expected return µ is suﬃciently high. The value of µ, however, would be determined by an equilibrium
market clearing mechanism, and so it seems reasonable to focus on the case when µ is low enough to ensure
a positive demand for the bond. We plan to investigate a general equilibrium version of our model in future
research, which would enable us see how asset pricing implications of relative concerns diﬀer when portfolio
constraints are present (our setting) and absent (Cuoco and Kaniel (2010)).
22When we consider a setting with multiple stocks and positive risk premium, the model is
no longer analytically tractable, and so numerical analysis is required. In addition to these
two features, we also incorporate heterogenous risk aversion since doing so strengthens the
generality of our analysis without signiﬁcantly complicating the computational algorithm.
Example 3 presents the corresponding setting and its analysis.
Example 3. Multiple stocks, positive risk premium, and heterogenous risk aversion. To
account for heterogeneous risk aversion, we adopt a setting described in Section 4 whereby
there are two types of managers: type-L (relatively less risk averse) and type-H (relatively
more risk averse), and we calibrate the model parameter values as in Example 1. We denote
by σ∗
L(i) and σ∗
H(i) the equilibrium portfolio volatilities of type-L and type-H managers with
index i, respectively. To account for multiple risky stocks with positive risk premium, we
consider three risky stocks, i.e., N = 3, whose excess returns are lognormally distributed with
mean µ = 6% per annum and the per annum volatilities σ1 = 10%, σ2 = 15%, and σ3 = 20%,
which are empirically plausible (see footnote 7 explaining why we abandon normality). Figure
5 plots the equilibrium volatilities, and so we again see that our main ﬁndings are robust








Figure 5: Equilibrium volatility under heterogeneous risk aversion, multiple
stocks, and positive risk premium. The equilibrium portfolio volatility of type-L (solid
line) and type-H (dashed line) managers. The calibration is as described in Example 3.
Finally, we investigate how the results of Example 3 are aﬀected once we lift the no-short-
sale constraints, which complements our analysis of the role of portfolio constraints in Section
4.1. The objectives of type-L managers are convex, and so we analyze the unconstrained
Example 3 where the economy is populated by type-H managers only (as explained in Section
4.1). Figure 6 depicts the equilibrium in this economy, and we see that the relation between
23interim performance and portfolio volatility is negative, which is contrary to the result in
the baseline economy of Section 3. Intuitively, the key economic mechanisms at work in
the baseline economy and in the unconstrained Example 3 are the reverse of each other –








Figure 6: Equilibrium volatility in the unconstrained Example 3. The equilibrium
portfolio volatility of type-H managers in the setting of Example 3 but with no type-L
managers. The parameter values are as described in Example 3.
Our model is tailored towards investigating a mutual fund tournament, and so we leave for
future work a rigorous analysis of a hedge fund tournament. However, based on our analysis
of the unconstrained economies, we may provide some preliminary thoughts on whether one
should expect the tournament behavior of (largely unconstrained) hedge fund managers to
be diﬀerent from our main predictions pertaining to mutual fund managers. While there
is extant literature documenting that the ﬂows-performance relation in the mutual fund
industry is convex, there is less consensus on the shape of this relation in the hedge fund
industry, with some studies documenting that the relation may be concave (Getmansky
(2005)). Given the concavity, the objective functions of risk averse hedge fund managers
would be concave in their relative performance. As a result, among the three unconstrained
Examples, it is presumably Example 3 which is more appropriate for describing a hedge fund
tournament. Supporting this conjecture, the equilibrium in the unconstrained Example 3
depicted in Figure 6 is broadly consistent with Brown, Goetzmann, and Park (2001) who
look at the hedge fund industry and ﬁnd “a signiﬁcant reduction in variance conditional upon
having performed well and limited evidence that managers who perform less well increase
their risk exposure.”
246. Endogenizing the Diﬀerence in Interim Performance
In this Section, we demonstrate that managers’ diﬀerential interim performance at time 1
(middle of the year), which was exogenously speciﬁed till now, arises endogenously due to
the managers’ following diﬀerent investment strategies at time 0 (beginning of the year).
While our main focus is on time-0 equilibrium, we also outline the ensuing equilibrium at
time 1, conﬁrming that the relation between interim performance and portfolio volatility is
positive, as in the baseline model. Finally, we investigate the trading volume implications of
tournament behavior by analyzing how managers rebalance their time-0 portfolios at time
1. This aspect has not yet been studied in related works (Taylor (2003), Goriaev, Palomino,
and Prat (2003)), and so our analysis oﬀers novel implications.
We retain all the features and assumptions of our baseline setting of Section 2, but extend
the timeline to include time 0 when managers can also trade. Since time 0 corresponds
to beginning of the year and interim performance has not yet accumulated, managers are
identical at time 0. Analogous to Section 2, we denote ¯ α0 to be the aggregate share of wealth
invested in the risky stock at time 0. Equivalently, we refer to ¯ α0 as the fraction of managers
who invest fully in the stock, as it turns out that no manager ﬁnds it optimal to hold both
stocks and bonds in her time-0 portfolio (as proved in Proposition 4). Consequently, to show
that the managers’ time-0 portfolios – and hence their interim performances – are diﬀerent,
it suﬃces to demonstrate that the equilibrium fraction of stockholders ¯ α∗
0 is neither zero nor
one, i.e., ¯ α∗
0 ∈ (0,1). We assume that the stock return between times 0 and 1, denoted by
x0, has the same distribution as between times 1 and 2, i.e., x0 is normally distributed with
mean 1 and variance σ2.
The deﬁnition of time-0 equilibrium is analogous to that at time 1 (Deﬁnition 1 in Section
2). Namely, taking ¯ α0 as given, manager i chooses her time-0 fraction of wealth invested in
the stock, denoted by α0(i), so as to maximize her expected terminal wealth. The equilibrium
¯ α∗
0 is such that the fraction of managers investing in the stock indeed equals ¯ α∗
0. Proposition
4 reports the time-0 equilibrium.
Proposition 4. In equilibrium at time 0, each manager invests either fully in the stock or in
the bond, i.e., α∗
0(i) = 0 or α∗
0(i) = 1 for all i ∈ [0,1]. The equilibrium fraction of managers
25investing in the stock, ¯ α∗


































Figure 7 plots the equilibrium fraction of time-0 stockholders ¯ α∗
0 as a function of the stock
volatility σ, obtained by solving equation (19). From Figure 7, we see that ¯ α∗
0 is diﬀerent from
zero and one, indicating that identical managers – with the same preferences, initial wealth,
and fund ﬂow functions – choose diﬀerent portfolios at time 0. To see why, suppose to the
contrary that all managers invest, say, in the stock. Given the convexity of the fund ﬂows,
it is optimal for any individual manager to invest in the bond so as to diﬀerentiate herself
from the rest, thus increasing the expected inﬂows. Another consequence of the convexity is
that the risky stock becomes more attractive when its volatility σ increases since a higher
volatility allows a manager to deviate more from the average manager’s portfolio. Hence,
the higher the volatility is the higher the fraction of managers investing in the stock in
equilibrium, and so ¯ α∗




Figure 7: Time-0 equilibrium. The equilibrium fraction of time-0 stockholders, ¯ α∗
0, as a
function of the stock volatility, σ.
The equilibrium at time 1 is essentially as in the baseline mode and is detailed in the proof
of Proposition 4 in the Appendix. There, the endogenous interim performance function r0(i)
26is a (weakly) increasing function (equations (A20) or (A24), depending on the stock return
x0). Consequently, the managers’ time-1 equilibrium portfolios and the industry strategy
essentially share the same features as in the baseline model (Propositions 1 and 2). Like
in the baseline analysis, all managers in equilibrium are divided into two groups based on
interim performance (the threshold is given by (A21), (A25), or (A26) depending on x0),
with the interim winners investing in the risky stock and the interim losers investing in the
riskless bond. That is, the main predictions of our one period model remain valid when we
endogenize the diﬀerential interim performance in this extended model.
When testing for the presence of a tournament among fund managers, existing literature
tends to focus exclusively on studying the relation between interim performance and risk.
The tournament incentives may, however, may well aﬀect the managers’ behavior in other
dimensions. We uncover one such dimension concerning the trading volume, by investigating
the equilibrium at two sequential times, beginning and middle of the year (t = 0,1 ). All
managers who rebalance their portfolios at time 1 follow a similar strategy: they sell all of
the asset they have bought at time 0 and use the proceeds to buy the other asset. Hence,
each manager generates a similar amount of trading, and so the total trading volume can be
proxied by the fraction of managers π who rebalance. Corollary 1 characterizes the trading
volume at time 1.
Trading volume Within-group share of trading Mid-year stock return
π time-0 bondholders time-0 stockholders x0
¯ α∗
0 − 1/2 0 1 − 1/(2¯ α∗
0) x0 ≥ 1
1/2 + (1 − ¯ α∗
0)/x0 1 (1/2 + (1 − ¯ α∗
0)(1/x0 − 1))/¯ α∗
0 2(1 − ¯ α∗
0) < x0 < 1
1 1 1 x0 ≤ 2(1 − ¯ α∗
0)
Table 1: Trading volume implications of tournament behavior. The fraction of
managers π who rebalance their portfolios at time 1 depending on the realization of the
stock return x0 over the ﬁrst half of the year. The equilibrium share of time-0 stockholders
¯ α∗
0 is as implicitly given in equation (19).
Corollary 1. The trading volume π, and the fractions of time-0 bondholders and stockhold-
ers generating the trading volume are given in Table 1. Consequently, the trading volume is
27negatively related to the mid-year stock return x0.
Corollary 1 reveals that the mid-year trading volume π decreases in the mid-year stock
return x0. Indeed, when the stock return is higher than the bond return at time 1, x0 ≥ 1,
the majority of managers do not trade while the remainder fraction, π = ¯ α∗
0 − 1/2 < 1/2,
rebalances (top row, ﬁrst cell in Table 1). To see this, ﬁrst note that time-0 bondholders are
interim losers at time 1 when x0 ≥ 1, and so from Proposition 1 it is optimal for them to
keep their investment in bonds, implying no trade (top row, second cell in Table 1). Time-0
stockholders, on the other hand, are interim winners, and so most of them keep their risky
stockholdings while only the fraction 1 − 1/(2¯ α∗
0) rebalances (top row, third cell in Table
1).17 Combining the behavior of time-0 bondholders and stockholders yields the relatively
low total trading volume, π = ¯ α∗
0−1/2. When the stock return is moderately lower than the
bond return, 2(1 − ¯ α∗
0) < x0 < 1, the majority of managers, π = 1/2 + (1 − ¯ α∗
0)/x0 > 1/2,
rebalances at mid year (middle row, ﬁrst cell in Table 1). Here, time-0 bondholders are
interim winners, and so they all sell bonds and buy stocks (middle row, second cell in Table
1). Time-0 stockholders are now interim losers, and so the majority of them rebalances, as
seen from (1/2 + (1 − ¯ α∗
0)(1/x0 − 1))/¯ α∗
0 > 1/2, while the remainder do not trade (middle
row, third cell in Table 1). Finally, when the stock return is suﬃciently low, x0 ≤ 2(1− ¯ α∗
0),
all managers rebalance (bottom row, Table 1).
7. Conclusion
This article investigates the validity of the so-called tournament hypothesis widely used in
empirical work. According to this hypothesis, interim winners are expected to decrease,
while interim losers are likely to increase, their portfolio volatility. We characterize the
managers’ equilibrium portfolios in a model of mutual fund tournament in the presence
of short-sales constraints, and uncover the opposite result: interim winners opt for a higher
portfolio volatility than interim losers. We demonstrate how diﬀerential interim performance
arises endogenously in the presence of tournament incentives, and also investigate the trading
volume implications of these incentives.
17From equations (9), it is straightforward to demonstrate that the equilibrium threshold i∗ lies within
the set of time-0 stockholders, dividing them into two groups. That is why they do not choose the same
portfolio at time 1 even though they have the same interim performance.
28It would be of interest to investigate a general equilibrium version of our model so as
to derive the asset pricing implications of tournament behavior. Cuoco and Kaniel (2010)
derive such implications in a model where portfolio constraints are absent. Comparing the
results of these two models would lead to a better understanding of the role of portfolio
constraints in the context of delegated portfolio management. Our brief analysis of the
risk averse examples with no constraints reveals that the predictions of the unconstrained
and constrained settings may be diﬀerent, which gives some indication that the tournament
incentives aﬀecting largely unconstrained hedge funds and constrained mutual funds may
not coincide. It would be interesting to examine this question further by analyzing a model
speciﬁcally built around the pertinent features of the hedge fund industry. While challenging,
it would also be valuable to analyze a fund tournament where the payoﬀ function is of the
“winner-takes-all” type.
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0(i)(α(i)x + 1 − α(i)) − ¯ r
0(¯ αx + 1 − ¯ α))
￿
. (A1)
The argument of the exponent in (A1) is a linear transformation of a normally distributed
return x, and so it has a normal distribution with mean and variance
E[r
0(i)(α(i)x + 1 − α(i)) − ¯ r
0(¯ αx + 1 − ¯ α)] = r
0(i) − ¯ r
0, (A2)
V ar[r
0(i)(α(i)x + 1 − α(i)) − ¯ r
0(¯ αx + 1 − ¯ α)] = σ
2(α(i)r
0(i) − ¯ α¯ r
0)
2. (A3)
We now use the following property: If v is normally distributed, v ∼ N(µv,σ2
v), then exp(v)
is log-normally distributed with mean E[exp(v)] = exp(µv + σ2
v/2). Using this property to
express the expectation in (A1) in terms of (A2)–(A3), we obtain that manager i’s best
response is given by
ˆ α(i) = arg max
α(i)∈[0,1]
(α(i)r
0(i) − ¯ α¯ r
0)
2. (A4)
Because the objective function in (A4) is convex in α(i), the maximum is achieved at either
α(i) = 0 or α(i) = 1. Evaluating the objective function at α(i) = 0 and α(i) = 1 and
subtracting the former from the latter, we obtain
(r
0(i) − ¯ α¯ r
0)







implying that manager i’s best response is ¯ α(i) = 1 when r0(i) ≥ 2¯ α¯ r0, and ¯ α(i) = 0
otherwise. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. First, we demonstrate that the solution of (9) exists and is









30If i∗ = 0, (A6) is not an equality since its left-hand side (LHS) is less than right-hand
side (RHS). Indeed, since r0(i) is increasing in i, r0(0) is the minimal value of r0(·) while
the integral in RHS computes the average value of r0(·). If i∗ = 1, (A6) is again not an
equality since LHS is positive and RHS is zero. Since both LHS and RHS are continuous
and monotonic in i, there exists a unique i∗ ∈ (0,1) such that (A6) holds.
We now demonstrate that i∗ and ¯ α∗ that solve (9) are indeed the equilibrium values.
Substituting the second equation in (9) into (A5) yields zero, meaning that manager i∗ is
indiﬀerent between investing in the stock and the bond. Hence, from (8) the (candidate)






1, if i ≥ i∗,
0, otherwise.
(A7)
Substituting (A7) into the aggregation condition (6), we see that (6) is satisﬁed as it is
equivalent to the ﬁrst equation in (9). That the equilibrium threshold r0(i∗) lies strictly
within the range of values of r0(i) follows from the earlier result that i∗ ∈ (0,1) coupled with
r0(i∗) being increasing. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. We ﬁrst prove the results for the case of multiple stocks and
zero risk premium, and then for the case of single stock and positive risk premium.
Multiple stocks and zero risk premium
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which replaces expression (4) obtained in the baseline model. Manager i, i ∈ [0,1], optimally
holds only one of the available assets in her portfolio due to the the convexity of her objective
function. Using the property of log-normal distribution (as in proof of Proposition 1), we
obtain that the expected value of manager i’s wealth (A8) if she fully invests in stock l, i.e.,
















For given aggregate strategies ¯ αk, k = 1,...,N, computing manager i’s best response amounts
to ﬁnding an asset k(i), k(i) = 0,1,...,N, such that investing in it maximizes (A9). Hence,
the best response condition is E[W(i)]|αk(i)(i)=1 ≥ E[W(i)]|αl(i)=1 for all l = 0,...N, which
































l ¯ αl¯ r
0, l = 0,...,N,
leading to (16).
Equilibrium. We consider two arbitrary managers i1,i2 ∈ [0,1], and without loss of
generality assume that i1 < i2, implying that manager i1 has a lower interim return than
manager i2 (as r0(i) increases in i). We prove by contradiction that manager i1 cannot
choose a more volatile asset than manager i2 in equilibrium. Suppose that managers i1 and
i2 choose assets k1 and k2, respectively, where k1 > k2 and σk1 > σk2. Since manager i1
chooses asset k1 over asset k2, we have that E[W(i1)]|αk1(i)=1 ≥ E[W(i1)]|αk2(i)=1, which








































k1, which is a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Single stock and positive risk premium
First, we compute the expected value of manager i’s wealth W(i) for a given portfolio
α(i) ∈ [0,1]. The expectation of the ﬁrst term in (4) is
E[R(i)] = r
0(i)(α(i)(µ − 1) + 1). (A14)
To ﬁnd the expectation of the second term in (4), we ﬁrst compute the mean and variance
of c(R(i) − ¯ R):
E[c(R(i) − ¯ R)] = c(α(i)r
0(i)(µ − 1) − ¯ α¯ r
0(µ − 1) + r
0(i) − ¯ r
0), (A15)
V ar[c(R(i) − ¯ R)] = c
2σ
2(α(i)r
0(i) − ¯ α¯ r
0)
2, (A16)
and then rely on the above property of lognormal distribution to obtain
E[exp(c(R(i)− ¯ R))] = c(α(i)r










Combining (A14) and (A17) and dropping the constants, we get that manager i’s best
response ˆ α(i) yields the maximum of the objective function
(1 + c)r
0(i)α(i)(µ − 1) + c
2σ
2(α(i)r
0(i) − ¯ α¯ r
0)
2/2. (A18)
Since (A18) is convex, its solution is either α(i) = 0 or α(i) = 1, and to determine which of
the two values constitutes the best response we subtract (A18) evaluated at α(i) = 0 from
(A18) evaluated at α(i) = 1:
(1 + c)r
0(i)(µ − 1) + c
2σ
2(r















Simple rearrangement reveals that (A19) is positive or equals zero when r0(i) ≥ 2¯ α¯ r0−2(1+
c)r0(i)(µ−1)/(cσ)2 and is negative otherwise, leading to the best response (17). Combining
the best response (17) with the aggregation condition (6) leads to (18). Q.E.D.
33Proof of Proposition 4. We conjecture that the structure of equilibrium at time 0 is
the same as that at time 1. Namely, all managers are divided into two groups, whereby one
group invests only in the stock and the other group invests only in the bond. We verify this
conjecture at the end of this Proof. For notational convenience, we deﬁne the new variable λ
representing the fraction of managers investing in the bond at time 0, λ ≡ 1−¯ α∗
0. Given that
the managers are identical at time 0, they can optimally invest in two diﬀerent assets only if
the expected wealth from these two strategies are the same. Hence, we look for λ such that
manager i is indiﬀerent between investing in the bond, α0(i) = 0, and in the stock, α0(i) = 1.
To compute manager i’s expected wealth (as of time 0) under the strategies α0(i) = 0 and
α0(i) = 1, we work backwards starting at time 1. The analysis of time-1 equilibrium depends
on what asset, stock or bond, is chosen by the majority of managers at time 0, i.e., whether
λ ≤ 0.5 or λ > 0.5. We present a detailed analysis for the case λ ≤ 0.5, and then comment
on the case λ > 0.5.
Time-1 equilibrium when λ ≤ 0.5
There are three diﬀerent equilibrium outcomes depending on whether the realization of
the stock return x0 is higher than 1 (bond return), between 2λ and 1, or lower than 2λ.






1 i ∈ [0,λ]
x0 i ∈ (λ,1].
(A20)
In this case, the equilibrium values of the threshold and the aggregate portfolio strategy are
i




Indeed, plugging i∗ = 0.5 into (A20) we obtain r0(i∗) = x0 and
R 1
i∗ r0(i)di = x0/2, and
substituting along with equation (A21) into (9) yields that (9) is satisﬁed. Sitting at time
1, we now compute manager i’s time-1 indirect utility function in equilibrium, denoted by
v(i). Substituting (A21) and α∗(i) = 1 (for an interim winner) or α∗(i) = 0 (for an interim





r0(i)−¯ r0+((r0(i)−x0/2)σ)2/2 if α∗(i) = 1 (A22)
r
0(i) + e
r0(i)−¯ r0+(x0σ)2/8 if α∗(i) = 0. (A23)






x0 i ∈ [0,1 − λ]
1 i ∈ (1 − λ,1].
(A24)
Note that in the above Outcome 1, lower values of the index i, i ∈ [0,λ], correspond to
time-0 bondholders while higher values, i ∈ [λ,1], correspond to time-0 stockholders. Now
the order is reversed, and the region i ∈ [0,1 − λ] corresponds to time-0 stockholders, with
i ∈ [1 − λ,1] corresponding to time-0 bondholders. Here and henceforth, the indexing order
is chosen to ensure that the interim performance function r0(i) is (weakly) increasing in i
for i ∈ [0,1], enabling us to apply the results of Proposition 2 in Section 3. From (9), we
obtain the equilibrium threshold and aggregate strategy as
i





Since ¯ α∗ is the same as for Outcome 1, manager i’s time-1 indirect utility function v(i) is
also the same, and is given by (A22)–(A23).
Outcome 3: x0 < 2λ. From (9), we obtain the equilibrium quantities
i
∗ = 1 − λ, ¯ α
∗ = λ/¯ r
0. (A26)





r0(i)−¯ r0+((r0(i)−λ)σ)2/2 if α∗(i) = 1 (A27)
r
0(i) + e
r0(i)−¯ r0+(λσ)2/2 if α∗(i) = 0. (A28)
Time-0 equilibrium when λ < 0.5
At time 0, for a given λ manager i chooses α0(i) so as to maximize her expected indirect
utility v(i). As described above, the equilibrium λ is such that manager i is indiﬀerent
35between α0(i) = 0 and α0(i) = 1, i.e., the expected value of v(i) under these two strategies
is the same. If α0(i) = 0, manager i is an interim loser if Outcome 1 occurs, but an interim
winner if Outcomes 2 or 3 occurs. Hence, v(i) is given by (A23) under Outcome 1, by (A22)
under Outcome 2, and by (A27) under Outcome 3, and so the expected value of v(i) is














Analogously, if α0(i) = 1 then v(i) is given by (A22) under Outcome 1, by (A23) under
Outcome 2, and by (A28) under Outcome 3, from which we obtain










Equating (A29) and (A30), and recalling that λ ≡ 1 − ¯ α∗
0, leads to (19). Solving (19)
numerically for a range of plausible volatilities σ reveals that its solution indeed satisﬁes the
condition ¯ α∗
0 > 0.5.
Following the same steps as above, we obtain that if there exists an equilibrium λ such




























Solving (A31) numerically reveals that its solution does not satisfy the condition λ > 0.5,
or, equivalently, ¯ α∗
0 < 0.5, meaning that we have only one equilibrium described by (19).
36Finally, for a wide range of plausible levels of volatility σ, we compute numerically the
expected values of v(i) at the interior portfolios, α0(i) ∈ (0,1), which reveals that the
expected v(i) for these interior portfolios is lower than for α0(i) = 0 and α0(i) = 1. This
conﬁrms the conjecture made at the beginning of this Proof. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1. As in the proof of Proposition 4, for convenience we use the
change of variable λ ≡ 1 − ¯ α∗
0. There, we established that when in equilibrium λ < 1/2,
for Outcome 1 the equilibrium threshold is i∗ = 1/2 and that time-0 bondholders lie on
the interval i ∈ [0,λ]. Hence, from Proposition 2 all time-0 bondholders as well as a share
(1/2 − λ)/(1 − λ) of time-0 stockholders invest in the bond at time 1 while the remaining
time-0 stockholders invest in the stock. This leads to the top row in Table 1. Applying
analogous reasoning for Outcomes 2 and 3 in the proof of Proposition 4 yields the middle
and bottom rows in Table 1. Q.E.D.
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